Ch=7 Airport Security

                                 Airport Security

  

One of the most significant issues facing A/Ps in early 21^ST century is of A/P security.

A/P security procedures are designed to deter, prevent, and respond to criminal acts that may affect the safety and security of the travelling public

• Criminal activity includes the hijacking of A/C, known as air piracy, damaging or destroying A/C with explosives, and other acts of terrorism, defined as the systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence against govt, public, or individuals to attain a political objective.
• Criminal activity also includes acts of assault, theft, and vandalism against passengers and their property, aircraft, and all A/P facilities.

HISTORY 

Between 1930 & 1958, a total of 23 hijackings and between 1968 & 1972, 364 hijackings  were recorded worldwide.First airport security regulations were made effective as FAR 107—Airport Security, in 1978. Under FAR Part 107, A/P operators were required to implement an airport security plan (ASP) and required to have all persons and vehicles allowed in the air operations area (AOA) suitably identified. A/P employees allowed in the AOA were subject to background checks prior to receiving proper identification and permission to enter into air operations areas.

FAR Part 107 was limited to security “as it affects safety in flight,” and did not extend to security in automobile parking lots or terminal areas distant from the air operations area.

• Throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, the FAA sponsored research on new equipment to detect bombs and weapons and made incremental improvements to aviation security that included efforts to upgrade the effectiveness of screening personnel at airports
• 10-year lull from airline security tragedies ended with the historical events of 9/11
• Worst international terrorist attack in history, involving four separate but coordinated A/C hijackings, occurred in the US by total of 19 alleged operatives of the Al-Qaida terrorist network.

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA)

After 9/11, US created Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

•  In 2003, the TSA employed a workforce of over 55,200 passenger and baggage screeners at 429 commercial service A/P in US, supervised by a team of 155 federal security directors (FSD) each assigned to one or more A/Ps, along with an admin staff of over 600 regional and national managers.
• Mission of the TSA is to protect all of the nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.
• Since its inception, TSA has concentrated its efforts on securing the transportation of passengers through the implementation of passenger and baggage screening requirements.

14-CFR TRANSPORTATION

Regulations regarding the security of A/P and other civil aviation ops have been moved to the Transportation Security Administration. They are published under Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR—Transportation) and are known as TSRs.

TSRs define specific areas of the airport that are subject to various security measures

1. AIR OPERATIONS AREAS
2. SECURE AREAS
3. STERILE AREAS
4. SIDA AREAS
5. EXCLUSIVE AREAS

Under the TSRs, each A/P operating under FAR Part 139, must have an A/P security plan (ASP) in which above areas are defined

AIR OPERATIONS AREA (AOA)

•  Air operations area (AOA) is defined as a portion of an A/P, specified in the A/P security program, in which security measures are carried out.
• ARea includes A/C movement areas, A/C parking areas, loading ramps, safety areas for use by A/C, and any adjacent areas (such as general aviation areas) that are not separated by adequate security systems, measures, or procedures.
• This area does not include the secure area.

SECURE AREA

• Secure area is defined as a portion of an A/P, specified in the A/P security program, in which certain security measures specified in 49CFR Part 1542—Airport Security are carried out
• This area is where A/C operators and foreign air carriers enplane and deplane passengers and sort and load baggage and any adjacent areas that are not separated by adequate security measures
• Secured area is the area at the A/P where commercial air carriers conduct the loading and unloading of passengers and baggage between their A/C and the terminal building

STERILE AREA

• Sterile area is defined as a portion of an A/P defined in the A/P security program that provides passengers access to boarding A/C and to which the access generally is controlled through the screening of persons and property.
• Specifically, sterile area is that part of the A/P to which passenger access must be gained through TSA passenger screening checkpoints.

SECURITY IDENTIFICATION DISPLAY AREA (SIDA)

• Security identification display area (SIDA) is defined as a portion of an A/P, specified in the A/P security program, in which security measures specified in the TSRs are carried out
• Area includes the secured area and may include other areas of A/P
• Within the SIDA, all persons must display proper identification or be accompanied by an authorised escort.

EXCLUSIVE AREA

• Exclusive area is defined as any portion of a secured area, AOA, or SIDA, including individual access points, for which an A/C operator or foreign air carrier that has a security program under 49 CFR Part 1544 or 49 CFR Part 1546 has assumed responsibility for the security of its area.
• Examples of exclusive areas include aircraft storage and maintenance hangars, air cargo facilities, and fixed-base operators (FBOs) serving general aviation and charter aircraft.

Areas that do not fall within the above definitions are considered public areas, and are not directly subject to TSA

SECURITY AT COMMERCIAL SERVICE AIRPORTS

At commercial service airports, areas of airport security are commonly categorised

1. PASSENGER SCREENING
2. BAGGAGE SCREENING
3. EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION
4. CONTROLLED ACCESS
5. PERIMETER SECURITY

PASSENGER SCREENING

Passenger Screening facilities include an automated screening process, conducted by a magnetometer that attempts to screen for weapons potentially carried on by a passenger that are metallic in content. As a passenger walks through a magnetometer, the presence of metal on the passenger is detected. If a sufficient amount of metal is detected, based on the sensitivity setting on the magnetometer, an alarm is triggered. Passengers who trigger the magnetometer are then subject to a manual search by a TSA screener.

Manual searches range from a further check of metal on the passenger’s person with the use of

• Handheld wand
• Manual pat down
• Inspection of the passenger’s shoes

Carry-on baggage screening facilities are located at security screening stations to examine the contents of passengers’ carry-on baggage for prohibited items such as firearms, sharp objects that may be used as weapons, or plastic or chemical-based trace explosives. All carry-on baggage is first inspected through the use of an x-ray machine. Bags selected because of suspicions as a result of the x-ray examination, or selected on a random basis, are further inspected through the use of explosive trace detection (ETD) equipment and/or by manual search. In addition, personal electronic items such as laptop computers or cellular phones are frequently inspected by being turned on and briefly operated to check for authenticity.

CHECKED-BAGGAGE SCREENING

• All A/P to checked baggage screened by certified explosive detection equipment prior to being loaded onto air carrier A/C (known as the 100 percent EDS rule).
• Primary piece of equipment used to perform checked-baggage screening is the Explosive Detection System (EDS), which uses technology similar to the technology found in medical CT scan machines, to detect and identify metal and trace explosives that may be hidden in baggage

EMPLOYEE IDENTIFICATION

• TSA regulations require any person who wishes to access any portion of an airport’s SIDA must display appropriate identification.
• Identification (SIDA badge), is usually in the form of a laminated credit card–sized identification badge with a photograph and name of the badge holder.
• Persons typically requiring a SIDA badge include airport employees, air carrier employees, concessionaires, contractors, and government employees such as air traffic controllers and airport security staff.
• SIDA badge may be colour coded or otherwise marked to identify the areas within the airport the badge holder may access. In addition, many identification badges are equipped with magnetic strips, bar codes, or other formats readable by electronic means which carry detailed data regarding access authority of the badge holder, including any associated personal identification numbers needed to enter through certain access points, areas of authorisation, as well as an electronic badge expiration date.

CONTROLLED ACCESS

• Variety of measures are used around A/P to prevent or control the movement of persons and vehicles to and from security-sensitive areas of the A/P property.
• At most commercial service airports, controlled access through doors that provide access to the AOA, secure areas, sterile areas, and other areas within the SIDA, as well as many employee-only restricted areas, is enforced by the use of control systems.
• Systems range from simple key locks to smart-access technologies, such as keypad entry systems requiring proper pass code. In many cases, pass codes are calibrated with a person’s SIDA badge, requiring both a presentation of the person’s badge and proper pass code entry to gain access.

BIOMETRICS

Biometrics are technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics such as fingerprints, eye retinas and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns, and hand measurements, especially for identification authentication purposes. Biometric devices typically consist of a reader or scanning device, software that converts the scanned information into digital form, and a database that stores the biometric data for comparison. Biometric technologies are found to be most applicable when controlling the access of those with SIDA badges at the airport. 

PERIMETER SECURITY

An important part of an airport’s security plan is its strategy for protecting the areas that serve as the border between secured and unsecured areas of the airport, known as the airport perimeter.

Four of the most common methods for securing the airport’s perimeter are

1. Perimeter Fencing
2. Controlled Access Gates
3. Area Lighting
4. Patrolling of Secured Area

PERIMETER FENCING

• Perimeter fencing is one of the most common methods of creating a barrier in easily accessible areas of an A/P’s secured area boundary.
• Fencing can differ in design, height, and type, depending on local security needs. Generally, the standards recommended by FAA Advisory Circular 107-1, Aviation Security, Airports, are followed.

CONTROLLED ACCESS GATES

• CAGs provide way for persons and especially vehicles to enter the secured area of the A/P through the A/P perimeter.
• Controlled access gates use from simple key entry or combination locks, to advanced identification authentication machines, involving either the entry of a personal access code or verification through biometric technology.
• Some CAGs are manned by guard personnel, further enhancing the security of the perimeter.
• Number of access gates surrounding an A/P’s perimeter be limited to the minimum required for the safe and efficient operation of the A/P.
• Active perimeter entrances of manned sites should be designated in order to enable guard force personnel the opportunity to maintain full control without unnecessary delay in traffic/reduction of ops efficiency.

SECURITY LIGHTING

• Security lighting is located in and around heavy traffic areas, A/C service areas, other operations and maintenance areas.
• Protective lighting provides a means of continuing, during the hours of darkness, a degree of protection approaching that which is maintained during daylight hours
• This safeguard is considerable deterrent to thieves, vandals, and potential terrorists
• Security lighting systems should be connected to an emergency power source, if available.
• Requirements for protective lighting at A/P will depend upon the local situation and the areas to be protected.
• Protective lighting is inexpensive to maintain and provide guard force personnel with added protection from surprise by the determined intruder.
• Good protective lighting is achieved by glaring lights oriented toward the avenue of approach of the potential intruder, and relatively little light on the guard personnel.   

Various lighting systems include:

Continuous Lighting.         

                 Most common protective lighting sys & consists of a series of fixed lights arranged to flood a given area with overlapping cores on a continuous basis during the hours of darkness.

Standby Lighting. 

                 Lights either automatically or manually turned on when an interruption of power occurs or when suspicious activity is detected.

Movable Lighting.    

                  This type of lighting consists of manually operated movable floodlights.

Emergency Lighting.   

             Duplication of any one of the above systems. Its use is limited to periods of power failure or other emergencies and is dependent upon an alternate power source.

PATROLLING

• Patrolling by A/P operations staff & local law enforcement, contributes in enhancing A/P perimeter security.
• Patrols of the airport perimeter are performed on a routine basis.
• Additionally, ATC towers keep a consistent watch over activities within the A/P perimeter.
• Because of the nature of the task, most ATC towers are situated to have an optimal view of the entire airfield, this facilitates the ability for ATC to spot potential security threats.
• Coordination between ATC, A/P ops staff, and local law enforcement further enriches the security of the A/P perimeter.

SECURITY AT GENERAL AVIATION AIRPORTS

• Majority of general aviation activity is performed by private pilots, using their own aircraft for the purposes of personal travel or recreation.
• Majority of general aviation A/C have less mass than commercial airliners and cargo A/C, making them relatively less suited for use as kinetic energy weapons or “guided missiles.” This in turn has led local law enforcement officials to historically labelling GA airports as “low security threats.”
• However, general aviation A/Ps have a number of characteristics that make them prone to potential security risks.
• Supervision is done by the users of the A/P themselves, including A/C owners, fixed-base operators, and A/P employees.
• Most other security measures in place at general aviation airports, such as fencing or controlled access gates, are designed more for deterrence rather than security measures.
• Similar to commercial service A/Ps, common security attributes that general aviation A/P may be equipped with are:

1.   Personnel and vehicle identification procedures
2.   Perimeter fencing
3.   Controlled access gates
4.   Security lighting
5.   Locks and key control
6.   Patrolling

TWELVE-FIVE AND PRIVATE CHARTER PROGRAMS

TWELVE-FIVE PROGRAM

49 CFR Part 1550.7 states that any A/C with a max certified T/O weight of 12,500 lbs or more must be thoroughly searched before departure and all passengers, crew members, and other persons and their accessible property, such as carry-on items, must be screened before boarding the A/C.

PRIVATE CHARTER PROGRAM

• 49 CFR Part 1544.101 states that all A/C used for private charter ops with max certified T/O weight of 100,309.3 lbs or with a passenger seating configuration of 61 or more must ensure that all passengers and their carry-on baggage are screened prior to aircraft boarding.
• General aviation A/Ps that serve these types of A/C ops should provide adequate space to allow for security compliance under these regulations.

FUTURE OF AIRPORT SECURITY

Since the first criminal threats to civil aviation, reactive policies are implemented to prevent further occurrences. 

This reactive paradigm has resulted in two consequences:

• Reduction in the number of attacks from a current type of threat.
• Creation of new threats against civil aviation that the system has not been prepared to mitigate.

As a result, future of airport security suggest  shift of policy, from a reactive approach to a proactive approach to protect against criminal acts by persons in and around the entire A/P environment. This proactive approach requires technological and human expertise to screen persons for suspicious activity, rather than simply screening them for unauthorized possessions.
Two such programs in development that address this include the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS II) and the Trusted Traveler Program.

COMPUTER ASSISTED PASSENGER PRE-SCREENING SYSTEM CAPPS II.

• CAPPS II, is profiling system which select passengers for additional screening based on air carrier itinerary and citizenship.
• CAPPS II  uses passenger info to verify identity and then determine risk, which is presented in a score and its corresponding color: red, yellow, or green.
• System is designed to start with four pieces of passenger information, voluntarily given when passengers purchase airline tickets: name, address, phone number, and date of birth.
• CAPPS II then combs criminal activity and other databases to build a risk assessment score based on verified passenger information.
• CAPPS II is designed to reduce the number of random security searches that have occurred since TSA regulations have been implemented.
• In addition, CAPPS II is designed to provide comprehensive pre-screening of passengers without racial bias.

TRUSTED TRAVELER PROGRAM 

 

• While CAPPS II focuses on prescreening passengers for prior criminal or other suspicious activity, a program known as Trusted Traveler is being developed to allow members of the traveling public to enter themselves into a database of “trusted travelers,” by submitting an application for the program and inviting a background check, similar to those performed for airport employees.
• Once accepted into the database, the trusted traveler would be relieved from secondary searches, which historically have existed on a random basis, or be allowed to proceed through expedited security screening at the airport.
• This program is thought by supporters to have the potential of significantly streamlining the efficiency of passenger screening at airports by allowing security screeners to focus their efforts on those persons not in the Trusted Traveler Program, while allowing those in the program to proceed more quickly through the airport terminal.

These programs, along with the further development of advanced biometric and information technologies, are expected to provide a contribution to enriching airport security, with the goal of proactively mitigating any future threats to the aviation system while preserving the efficiency of the system itself.